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Auto-referential materials (i.e., the own name) have been described as particularly prone to 
capture attention. Some recent studies have questioned this view and showed that these own 
name effects are temporary and appear only in specific conditions: when enough resources are 
available (Harris & Pashler, 2004) or when the own name is presented within the focus of 
attention if it is a task-irrelevant stimulus (Gronau et al., 2003). In the present study, a 
stimulus that is unique to each individual was used: the self-face. In Experiment 1, the self-
face produced a temporary distraction when presented at fixation during a digit-parity task. 
However, this distraction was not different from that triggered by another highly familiar face. 
In Experiment 2, the self-face failed to produce interference when presented outside the focus 
of attention. These results confirm recent findings showing that auto-referential materials do 
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Since the late fifties, self-referential stimuli have been described as particularly important 
with regard to their capacity to grab attention by comparison with other stimuli. This claim 
emerged from a famous study by Moray (1959). Using the method of shadowing during a 
dichotic listening task, Moray (1959) found that 4 participants out of 12 (33%) remembered 
that they had heard their own name at its first presentation to the unattended ear while they 
were shadowing (i.e., repeating aloud) a message presented to the other ear. On the contrary, a 
short list of neutral words presented many times to the unattended ear showed no trace of 
being remembered. This suggested that some high-priority important stimuli can capture 
attention because of their meaning. However, there was no way to exclude the possibility that 
subjects from time to time shifted their attention to the to-be-ignored message (see Lachter, 
Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004). More evidence for some “own name effects” has also been found 
in various studies using different procedures. For instance, in a visual analogy of the Moray’s 
procedure, Wolford and Morrison (1980) showed that when instructed to make a parity 
judgment on two digits flanking a to-be-ignored word, a higher proportion of participants 
subsequently reported that they had seen their own name in comparison with words presented 
the same number of times during the experiment. Shapiro’s team later showed that the own 
name is particularly resistant to the attentional blink (Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) 
and to repetition blindness (Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999). In addition, Mack and Rock 
(1998) found that almost all of their participants (88%) detected their own name when 
presented under conditions of inattention in the inattentional blindness paradigm. By 
comparison, only 65% of participants detected another first name and 50% of participants 
detected very frequent words in the English language (e.g. “house”). Using a visual search 
task, Mack and Rock (1998) also showed that, contrary to other names, the own name pops 
out of a display of up to 12 items. 
All these studies investigated the attentional properties of the own name. However, the 
name (i.e., the first name as well as the last name) is a property that we may share with other 
people. By contrast, the face is a unique self-referential characteristic (with the exception of 
twins) and hence constitutes a better way to investigate the specificity of self-referential 
stimuli. However, few studies (Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; Laarni, Koljonen, 
Kuistio, Kyröläinen, Lempiäinen, & Lepistö, 2000; Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, & 
Tashiro, 1998; Tong & Nakayama, 1999) investigated the attentional properties of the self-
face. Recently, using a face-name interference paradigm, Brédart et al. (2006) found that the 
self-face flanking a classmate’s name produced a stronger interference on the processing of 
this name than in the reverse situation where a classmate’s face flanked the participant’s own 
name. This suggests that the self-face also has some attention-grabbing capacity. Tong and 
Nakayama (1999), in a visual search task, demonstrated that the self-face was more quickly 
detected among distractors than strangers’ faces even when presented in atypical orientations 
and after hundreds of trials. Several ERP or PET studies also found specific 
electrophysiological and neuronal responses associated with attention to the self-face by 
comparison with other unfamiliar faces (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; 
Ninomiya et al., 1998; Sugiura et al., 2000; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006; Tanaka, Curran, 
Porterfield, & Collins, 2006) or familiar faces (Sui et al., 2006). All these findings suggest 
that important stimuli may benefit from specific attention-grabbing capacities. Taken 
together, these results seem in favour of a late selection theory of attention (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963) because they suggest that the meaning and significance of some stimuli can 
determine their selection by attention. However, many studies used neutral words, unfamiliar 
faces or names as control stimuli. Hence, these results might just reflect a familiarity effect 
rather than a genuine “self-effect”. That might weaken the argument in favour of a late 
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selection theory of attention because this could indicate that familiarity rather than meaning 
determines the attentional selection. 
In addition, recent research has seriously questioned the specificity of self-referential stimuli 
by suggesting that such stimuli are not really special and do not benefit from particular 
attention-grabbing capacities. A study by Bundesen, Killingsbæk, Houmann, and Jensen 
(1997) challenged previous findings with respect to the attention-grabbing capacities of the 
own name. They used displays composed of four names, two written in red (targets to be 
reported) and two written in white (distractors to be ignored). The participant’s name 
appeared on some trials either as target either as distractor. Results showed that the own name 
did not cause more interference than other names when it was a distractor suggesting that it 
does not automatically grab attention. Laarni et al. (2000) found that when participants had to 
perform a matching task on two faces presented at foreground while ignoring the background 
composed of a matrix of faces among which the participant’s own face or a celebrity face (the 
Finnish President) was presented on some trials (i.e., critical trials), only 18% of participants 
reported that they had seen their own face during the task and the performance was similar for 
both familiar faces. These results could be interpreted in terms of an early selection of 
attention occurring at an early stage of processing (Broadbent, 1958) preventing the 
processing of significant stimuli when they were already discarded from the perceptual 
process by the properties of their low level features (e.g., irrelevant colour, irrelevant 
background location, see also Bundesen et al., 1997). 
Finally, some studies using the own name moderated findings presented here above by 
showing that some “self-effect” can occur but only when specific conditions are fulfilled. For 
instance, Kawahara and Yamada (2004) replicated Bundesen et al. (1997)’s findings but 
additionally showed, using an adapted version of the attentional blink paradigm, that the own 
name only attracted attention when participants were set to identify target names whereas it 
did not when participants were set to find a target colour. Similarly, using a Stroop-like task 
Gronau, Cohen, and Ben-Shakhar (2003) found that the own name attracted attention when it 
was presented centrally within the participant’s attentional focus. However, when it was 
presented peripherally it attracted attention only when it was task relevant but not when it was 
task irrelevant. Harris, Pashler, and Coburn (2004) also call Mack and Rock (1998)’s visual 
search findings into question by showing that even if the participant’s own name is detected 
more rapidly than other names, the search slopes they obtained were not flat enough to claim 
that the own name pops out. In another experiment based on the paradigm designed by 
Wolford and Morrison (1980), Harris and Pashler (2004) showed that the presentation of the 
own name can cause a distraction and slow down reaction times on a digit-parity task by 
comparison with neutral words on condition that enough capacity is available. In this case 
however the distraction is only present during the first occurrences of the own name and the 
response quickly habituates. Moreover, the own name did not show special attention grabbing 
property when display loads were more substantial. Taken together, this set of results suggests 
that the first occurrences of one’s own name may provoke an involuntarily shift of attention 
when the perceptual load of one’s ongoing activity is low and enough capacity is available for 
one’s name to be perceived, but that it rapidly loses its attention grabbing character.  
From this overview of the literature, it remains unclear whether or not self-referential 
materials have specific attention-grabbing capacity. Moreover, controls used to determine 
whether these stimuli have special attention-grabbing capacities were not always the most 
appropriate ones and some confounding factors such as familiarity, frequency of use or 
emotional valence could have interfered. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the 
distractive potency of an extremely distinctive self-significant stimulus, i.e. the self-face, and 
in the meantime disentangling the potential effect of stimulus familiarity. In Experiment 1, we 
tested whether one’s own face is harder to ignore as a distractor than other unfamiliar faces. If 
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results found in the Harris and Pashler (2004) study can be generalised from the own name to 
other self-significant stimuli, it was expected that the first presentation of the participants’ 
face would produce a momentary distraction. To determine how much such effect was 
specific to one’s own face, distraction due to the presentation of another personally familiar 
face (the face of a participant’s classmate) was also evaluated. 
In the Harris and Pashler (2004) study, distractors were presented centrally, i.e. between the 
items to be processed for the primary task. Gronau et al. (2003) demonstrated that the 
presentation of one’s name outside the focus of attention did not interfere with a primary task 
if one’s name was not relevant to this primary task. Hence, it was predicted that the 
presentation of the participant’s own face as an irrelevant flanking distractor would produce 
no disruption of the primary task at all. This point was addressed in Experiment 2. 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
The experiment used the digit-parity task described by Wolford and Morrison (1980) and 
Harris and Pashler (2004), i.e. a task in which participants indicated whether two 
simultaneously presented digits had the same parity or not. By analogy with the Harris and 
Pashler study, during the first block of trials, familiar faces (either one’s face or a classmate’s 
face) were presented infrequently. In the second block of trials familiar faces were presented 




A total of 48 undergraduate students (mean age = 20; 30 women) volunteered. They had all 
known their same-gender classmate for at least 2 years. Participants were recruited by pairs so 
that each participant served as the classmate for the other participant. 
 
2.1.2. Materials and stimuli 
Displays were presented on a monitor controlled by a PC computer. They consisted of two 
digits flanking a face and were viewed at a distance of 56 cm controlled by means of a chin 
rest. The digits subtended 0.7° by 0.5° of visual angle, were spaced 4° apart, and located 2° 
from fixation each. They were written in black against a grey background. All face stimuli 
were greyscales images of full-frontal views of faces without facial hair or glasses. The 
picture of the participant’s own face was presented in a mirror-reversed orientation, i.e. the 
view in which we typically see our own face. The pictures were centred at fixation and 
subtended 4.1° by 3.3° of visual angle (see Fig.1b). 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two blocks of 48 trials each. In Block 1, the participant’s own 
face and the face of the participant’s classmate were presented once each. Half of the 
participants saw their own face on Trial 29 and their classmate’s face on Trial 39, the other 
half saw these two familiar faces in the reverse order. Pictures of unfamiliar faces were shown 
on the other trials. Each unfamiliar face appeared once only. In Block 2, the participant’s face 
appeared on 12 trials, the classmate’s face appeared on 12 trials and 24 new unfamiliar faces 
appeared on the remaining 24 trials. Faces were presented randomly except that the same face 
could not be shown twice successively. 
Participants were instructed to focus on the digit-parity task and ignore the faces. Each trial 
began with a fixation point (diameter = 0.2 degrees) presented in the centre of fixation for 1 s. 
The point was followed, after 500 ms, by a 200-ms (unmasked) exposure of the digits and 
face. Half of the participants pressed the “C” key of a computer keyboard if the digit parity 
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matched, and otherwise pressed the “N” key. These keys were reversed for the other 
participants. A 1-s interval separated successive trials (see Fig.1a). 
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Illustration of the time course of a single trial in the two experiments (the 
stimulus display represented here corresponds to displays in Experiment 1); (b) in 
Experiment 1, faces were presented at fixation between two digits; (c) in Experiment 2, faces 




2.2.1. Reactions times 
Data of 15 participants who made errors on Trial 29 or 39 were discarded. 
 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 29, 
30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
reaction times (RTs). There was a significant effect of Trial, F(4,124) = 8.32, p = 0.00001. 
HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated a significant elevation on the first two trials in which a 
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familiar face was presented by comparison with preceding and following trials, all ps < 0.05. 
There was no significant effect of Order, F(1,31) < 1, and no significant interaction, F(4,124) 
< 1 (see Fig.2a). 
 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unfamiliar) as within-subject 
factor was conducted on RTs. There was a significant effect of Identity, F(2,64) = 3.28, p = 
0.04. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated that the difference between the RTs in the ‘self-face’ 
condition (M = 1070 ms) and the RTs in the ‘unfamiliar face’ condition (M = 1002 ms) was 
marginally significant, p = 0.058. In addition, RTs when the classmate was presented (M = 
1062 ms) tended to be slower than RTs when an unfamiliar face was presented, p = 0.10. 
Finally, there was no significant difference between the ‘self-face’ condition and the 
‘classmate’s face’ condition, p = 0.96 (see Fig.2b). Data of Block 2 were then split in 2 parts 
to examine separately the pattern of performance on the first and second halves of trials (see 
Fig.2c). The analysis of RTs during the first half of Block 2 confirmed the above effect of the 
Identity, even if the difference was only marginally significant, F(2,64) = 2.99, p = 0.058. 
Conversely, the analysis of RTs during the second half of Block 2, did not reveal any effect 
of the Identity, F(2,64) < 1. 
 
2.2.2. Error rates 
Data of one participant who misunderstood the instructions were discarded (this participant 
responded to 26 out of 96 trials only). 
 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 29, 
30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
error rates. There was a significant effect of Trial, F(4,180) = 4.97, p = 0.0008. HSD Tukey 
post-hoc indicated that when a familiar face was presented for the second time (M = 25.4% 
on trial 39), error rates were higher by comparison with preceding (M = 8.3% for trials 20 to 
28 and M = 7.1% for trials 30 to 38) and following trials (M = 8.5% for trials 40 to 48) and 
by comparison with trial 29 (M = 10.6%), all ps <0.02. There was no significant effect of 
Order, F(1,45) = 1.22; p = 0.27, and no interaction, F(4,180) < 1 (see Fig.2d). 
 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unknown) as within-subject 




Present results indicate that the self-face, like the own name, can produce a distraction. Like 
the own name however, the self-face has no enduring attention grabbing capacity as the 
response habituates after a few presentations. In addition, the pattern of interference produced 
by the self-face and by the other highly familiar face was similar both in Block 1 and Block 2. 
The distraction produced by the two familiar faces impacted both dependant measures but was 
stronger on reaction times than on error rates. This suggests that the irrelevant presence of a 
familiar face mainly slows down the processing of the task-relevant items (i.e. the digits) but 
has a more limited effect on response accuracy. The second experiment examined the effect of 
the presentation of a familiar face (i.e., the self-face or the classmate’s face) outside the focus 
of attention. It was predicted that the presentation of the self-face as an irrelevant flanking 
distractor would produce no disruption of the digit parity task at all (see Gronau et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1: (a) Mean reaction times (RTs) and (d) mean error rates to 
the digit-parity task as a function of the order of presentation of the familiar faces in Block 1; 
familiar distractor faces appeared on trials 29 and 39. (b) Mean RTs and (e) mean error rates 
as a function of the Identity of the distractor face presented in Block 2. (c)Mean RTs as a 
function of the distractor face’s Identity presented on the first and the second halves of Block 
2. Error bars represent the standard error of the means. 
 




A total of 48 undergraduate students (mean age = 21; 20 women) volunteered. They had all 
known their same-gender classmate for at least 2 years. Participants were recruited by pairs so 
that each participant served as the classmate for the other participant. 
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3.1.1. Stimuli and procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that faces were presented in a flanking 
position instead of a central position. Faces were randomly presented on the left side of the 
left digit or on the right side of the right digit so that the centre of the picture was 5° from 
fixation (see Fig.1c). 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2: (a) Mean reaction times (RTs) and (d) mean error rates to 
the digit-parity task as a function of the order of presentation of the familiar faces in Block 1; 
familiar distractor faces appeared on trials 29 and 39. (b) Mean RTs and (e) mean error rates 
as a function of the Identity of the distractor face presented in Block 2. (c)Mean RTs as a 
function of the distractor face’s Identity presented on the first and the second halves of Block 
2 . Error bars represent the standard error of the means. 
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Data of 2 participants could not be collected entirely (1 because of technical reasons and 1 
because the participant felt uncomfortable during the experiment) and were discarded from 
all analyses. 
 
3.2.1. Reaction times 
Data of 8 other participants who made errors on Trial 29 or 39 were discarded. 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate -self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 29, 
30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
RTs. There was no significant effect of Trial, F(4,144) = 1.02, p = 0.40, no significant effect 
of Order, F(1,31) < 1, and no significant interaction, F(4,124) < 1 (see Fig.3a). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unfamiliar) as within-subject 
factor was conducted on RTs and showed no significant effect, F(2,74) = 2.28, p = 0.11 (see 
Fig.3b). Nonetheless, as the pattern of performance was quite similar to that observed in 
Block 2 of Experiment 1 (see Fig.2b and Fig.3b) we split data of Block 2 in 2 parts to 
examine separately the pattern of performance on the first and second halves of trials. The 
analysis of RTs during the first half of Block 2 revealed a marginal effect of Identity, F(2,74) 
= 3.911, p = 0.0504. HSD Tukey post-hoc indicated that the difference between the RTs in 
the ‘classmate’s face’ condition (M = 1122 ms) and the RTs in the ‘unfamiliar face’ 
condition (M = 976 ms) was significant, p = 0.039. RTs in the ‘self-face’ condition (M = 
1045 ms) did not differ from RTs in the ‘classmate’s face’ condition, p = 0.39, or in the 
‘unfamiliar face’ condition, p = 0.47 By contrast, the analysis of RTs during the second half 
of Block 2 did not show any effect of Identity, F(2,74) = 1.245, p = 0.29 (see Fig.3b). 
 
3.2.2. Error rates 
Block 1. A mixed two-way 2 (Order: self-classmate, classmate-self) by 5 (Trial: 20 to 28, 29, 
30 to 38, 39, 40 to 48) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
error rates. There was no significant effect of Trial, F(4,176) < 1, no significant effect of 
Order, F(1,44) < 1, and no interaction, F(4,180)=1.32; p=0.27 (see Fig.3d). 
Block 2. A one-way ANOVA with Identity (self, classmate, unknown) as within-subject factor 
was conducted on error rates and showed no significant effect, F(2,90) < 1 (see Fig.3e). 
 
3.3. Discussion 
In agreement with previous studies using the own name (Gronau et al., 2003), present results 
indicate that the self-face presented outside the focus of attention and irrelevantly for the 
ongoing task produces no distraction in Block 1 or in Block 2 overall, as reflected by both 
reaction times and error rates. However, a complementary analysis of Block 2 indicated that 
the facial identity marginally affected reaction times on the first half of trials. Here, the 
distraction was due to the processing of the classmate’s face. Yet, as in Experiment 1, this 
effect disappeared in the second part of Block 2. This might indicate that after a few dozen of 
trials, when participants master the digit-parity task, they start shifting their attention at 
periphery and process the distractor faces. These shifts produce a weak interference effect that 
is not strong enough to overall affect performance in Block 2 and that habituates quickly. By 
contrast, in Block 1 the two appearances of the familiar faces did not interfere with the digit-
parity task, probably because at that time the participants’ attentional resources are still 
devoted to the digit-parity task. This small effect of familiar faces irrelevantly presented at 
periphery might seems at odds with Gronau et al. (2003)’s findings. However, this effect 
appeared lately in the experiment, lasted a very limited number of trials and was detected only 
through post-hoc analyses in the absence of a main effect of Identity. More importantly the 
occurrence of this effect indicates that facial identity was perceivable at this eccentricity. In 
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other words, the non-occurrence of interference effect in Block 1 cannot be attributed to a 
lack of perception of peripheral distractor faces. 
 
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Present results indicate that the self-face, a particularly distinctive feature of the self, has no 
enduring distractive power compared with unfamiliar faces when it is presented at fixation, 
within the observer’s attentional focus. Indeed, the self-face was only momentarily more 
distractive than unfamiliar faces. In addition, crucially the self-face was never consistently 
more distractive than that of another familiar person. Therefore, present results suggest that 
the allocation of attention was temporarily driven by the high familiarity of the to-be-ignored 
distractor faces rather than by the self-referential properties of the self-face. Yet, and contrary 
to the participant’s name which may be shared by other individuals, the participant’s own face 
is exclusively self-referential. Thus, one might have expected that it is even more likely than 
one’s own name to attract attention by comparison with other faces. However the present 
study demonstrates that one’s own face is not an exceptional kind of stimulus since it rapidly 
loses its attention grabbing character. The present study extends Harris and Pashler (2004)’s 
work by showing that even a unique self-referential stimulus such as one’s own face is not a 
potent distractor, at least when its presentation is not related with the ongoing task. 
Moreover, in the present study, the self-face did not elicit reliable distraction effect when it 
was presented outside the focus of attention. This result is consistent with Gronau et al.’s 
(2003) study reporting that the participant’s own name did not produce any distraction when 
presented outside the focus of attention and irrelevantly to the ongoing task. Nonetheless, our 
data indicated that participants temporarily shifted their attention towards peripheral faces 
once they mastered the digit-parity task. Importantly, the observation that the capacity of the 
familiar faces to provoke a distraction was dependent upon their location within the focus of 
attention indicates that this distraction is not due to an automatic capture of attention (see also 
Bundesen et al., 1999). Indeed, in Experiment 1 the central location of the faces between the 
two target digits forced participants to attend to the distractor faces (despite of the instruction) 
in order to perceive the two digits. By contrast, in Experiment 2, there was no need to attend 
to the distractor faces presented at periphery in order to process the target digits. Our results 
indicate that in this case participants successfully followed the instruction to ignore the faces 
in the first part of the experiment since the presentation of the familiar faces did not affect 
reaction times. In the second part of the experiment however, they apparently temporarily 
shifted their attention towards peripheral faces. Rather, present findings suggest that familiar 
faces hold attention and elicit a transient difficulty to disengage attention only once they are 
attended1, as in Experiment 1 and in the second part of Experiment 2 (see Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001, for similar findings with threatening words; see also Weierich, 
Treat, & Hollingworth, in press, for a recent review on the distinction between capture and 
retention of attention in anxiety). This hypothesis should be addressed more precisely and 
with paradigms allowing a clear distinction between these two components of capture and 
retention of attention in future work. Note that the digit-parity task we used is a quite 
demanding task. Harris and Pashler (2004)’s study showed that the attention grabbing 
capacity of one’s own name depended on the amount of available resources. It is possible that 
a less demanding task would have allowed more substantial shifts of attention towards the 
peripheral distractor faces. This should also be addressed in future work. 
In sum, present result does not support the widespread claim that self-referential stimuli or 
information important to the participant automatically summon attention. Yet, such a claim is 
still viewed as evidence for the late selection theory of attention even in recent cognitive 
                                                 
1
 We thank Jan Theeuwes for this suggestion. 
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psychology textbooks (e.g. Smith & Kosslyn, 2007; Solso, MacLin, & MacLin, 2005; 
Sternberg, 2006). Moreover, the present results, as well as those of Harris and Pashler 
(2004)’s study, stress that the response to one’s own face or one’s own name habituates very 
rapidly. This finding has important practical and clinical implications. Indeed, recent 
neuropsychological research used self-referential stimuli such as the patients’ own name in 
order to assess residual awareness of the environment in non-communicative brain-damaged 
patients (i.e., patients in a vegetative or in a minimally conscious state). In such studies, 
properties of a patient’s brain responses (e.g. ERPs) elicited when hearing her/his own name 
is supposed to inform us about the perception of this stimulus in the environment (Perrin et 
al., 2006; see also Holeckova, Fischer, Giard, Delpuech, & Morlet, 2006; Perrin et al., 2005). 
The fact that responses to self-referential may habituate quickly has not been addressed in 
such studies, presumably because, again, it was assumed that self-referential materials 
automatically grab attention (e.g. Holeckova et al., 2006; Sui et al., 2006; but see Laureys, 
Perrin, & Brédart, 2007). Yet, in most of these studies, the same self-referential stimulus was 
usually presented several times during the experimental session. After the results from Harris 
and Pasher (2004) and the present study, it seems that averaging across repeated trials is likely 
to fail giving rise to patients’ responses that occurred after the first few presentations of self-
referential materials. 
In conclusion, present findings demonstrate that a unique and distinctive self-referential 
stimulus such as one’s own face is not a potent distractor compared to other faces. The 
distraction it produces does not differ from that produced by another familiar face, is only 
temporary and is modulated by the position of the face within the participant’s focus of 
attention. Future work should clarify whether this distraction is due to a difficulty to 
disengage attention as hypothesized here and/or whether the self-face has the capacity to 
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